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THE NECESSITY OF PRECAUTION:
THE FUTURE OF ECOLOGICAL NECESSITY AND
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
Daniel Dobos*

"If we err in our decisions affecting the future of our children and
our planet, let us err on the side of caution."'
INTRODUCTION

One challenge facing international environmental law in the
twenty-first century is to implement the rhetoric of the 1990s. The
Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project2 ("Danube Dam
Case") presents one such challenge. A primary issue in this case
was whether Hungary was entitled in 1989 to use the defense of
ecological necessity to suspend its involvement in a joint investment

* The author is a 6th Year Law/Engineering student at the
University of Melbourne in Australia and will graduate in 2003.
This Note received the 2001 Baily Exhibition, awarded annually to
the highest ranked student in International Law at the University of
Melbourne. The author would like to thank Stuart Oldham in
Hungary for his research assistance.
1. James Cameron & Julie Abouchar, The Precautionary
Principle: A Fundamental Principle of Law and Policy for the
Protection of the Environment, 14 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 1
(1991) (quoting Gro Brundtland, Keynote Speech at Opening
Session of Conference on Action for a Common Future in Bergen,
Norway (May 8, 1990)).
2. Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung.
v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 35 (Sept. 25). Generally, International Court
of Justice cases are easily accessible at http://www.I.C.J.-cij.org.
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project with Slovakia to construct a system of locks.3 The
Agreement between the two countries describes the locks as a
"barrage system ...

designed to attain the broad utilization of the

natural resources of the Bratislava-Budapest section of the Danube
River for the development of water resources, energy, transport,
agriculture and other sectors of the national economy of the
Contracting Parties."4 While Hungary ultimately failed in this
respect, the International I.L.C. of Justice's ("I.C.J.") articulation of
the defense of ecological necessity introduced a myriad of new
challenges for international environmental law.'
This Note explores the defense of ecological necessity, and
specifically, whether it can accommodate the precautionary
principle. Part I places ecological necessity within a historical
framework, tracing the origins of the defense and applying the
modern formulation of the defense to a new ecological context. Part
II introduces the precautionary principle, observing its unlikely
application to ecological necessity in 1989 while recognizing its
present potential. This possibility, along with the future direction of
the defense is examined in Part III.

I. ECOLOGICAL NECESSITY: PAST AND PRESENT

A. HistoricalOrigins of Necessity
Necessity began as a defense for the purpose of self-preservation
that could be invoked by a state committing an otherwise unlawful
act.' Hugo Grotius, widely considered the "father of international
3. Id. at 30, 50.
4. Id. at 13 (citations omitted).
5. See generally id.
6. Report of the International Law Commission to the General
Assembly on the Work of its Thirty-second Session, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/318/ADD. 5-7 (1980) (addendum to the eighth report on
state responsibility by Roberto Ago) [hereinafter Ago Report],
reprinted in [1980] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 16, 16-17, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.1; Roman Boed, State of Necessity as a
Justificationfor Internationally Wrongful Conduct, 3 YALE HUM.
RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 6 (2000). Boed extensively cites the 20th
century translation of Hugo Grotius' De Jure Belli Ac Pacis, Libre
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law," 7 observed in the 17th century that a nation's right of necessity
arose from internal Jewish and Roman law which "forbids us to kill
anyone, who has taken our goods, unless for the preservation of our
own lives."8 Other 19th century scholars echoed Grotius' sentiments
that in order to protect the right of self-preservation, a state may
"violate the territorial sovereignty or international right of another
state."9 This right could only be used in a narrow context, and thus
Grotius emphasized that "even where the emergency can be plainly
proved, nothing can justify... taking or applying the property...
beyond the immediate demands of that emergency."'"
Since necessity constituted a right to self-preservation," decisionmakers were faced with the vexing question as to which right was
superior-the right of a state to have its international obligations
upheld, or the competing right of another state to breach the former
state's rights in exercising its own right of self-preservation.'
Compounded by the vagueness of a "right,"' 3 this conception of
necessity inevitably proved to be untenable. 4

Tres (A.C. Campbell trans., 1901).
Throughout this Note,
parentheticals will be included to distinguish Boed's citations to
Grotius.
7. Boed, supra note 6, at 5.
8. Id. at 4 (quoting Grotius) (citations omitted); see also supra
text accompanying note 6.
9. Id. at 6 (quoting AMOS HERSHEY, THE ESSENTIALS OF
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW AND ORGANISATION 231 (1927)).
10. Id. at 5 (quoting Grotius) (citations omitted); see also supra
text accompanying note 6.
11. See, e.g., id. at 4-7 (reviewing the development of the concept
of necessity).
12. See, e.g., CHARLES G. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 14243 (1924).
13. Id. "[T]he conflict of international rights thus resulting is
governed by a few general principles of law, which are, however, so
vague as to leave it an open question in many cases whether the right
of one has justified a breach of the right of the other." Id.
14. See Boed, supra note 6, at 4-7 (providing a more detailed
history of the concept of necessity).
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B. Modem Defense of Necessity
In the 1970s, the International Law Commission ("I.L.C.")
commissioned a comprehensive study by Professor Robert Ago on
the concept of necessity. 5 This study was later relied on in the
codification of necessity as embodied in Article 33 of the I.L.C.
Draft Articles on State Responsibility.16 Article 33 was accepted by
the I.C.J. in the Danube Dam Case as a reflection of customary
international law, 7 and constituted the basis of the I.L.C.'s
formulation of the defense of ecological necessity. 8
Most significantly, the modern defense emphatically rejects the
notion of a right to self-preservation in favor of a broader essential
interest of a state, which may excuse wrongful conduct. 9 The
historical approach, besides frustrating decision-makers, was found
to be the "product of pure abstract speculation with no basis in
international legal reality, and [had] since become outdated."2 A
state seeking to invoke the defense must now prove: 1) it was
15. Id. at7.
16. For the version endorsed by the I.C.J., see International Law
Commission: Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Aug. 4, 1998,
37 I.L.M. 440, art 33 [hereinafter Draft Articles]. For the original
version, see [1980] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 49. But see Report of
the International Law Commission on the work of its Fifty-first
Session, U.N. Doc. A/54/10 (1999) (suggesting that the revised
version be used [hereinafter 1999 Report], available at
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/1999/english/99rep fra.htm (last
visited May 21, 2002).
17. Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung.
v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 33-37 (Sept. 25).
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. Ago Report, supra note 6. Ago's rejection of the concept of a
right is supported by Bin Cheng's analysis of the early decision of
The Neptune. Id. at 34 (citing 4 J. B. MOORE, INTERNATIONAL
ADJUDICATIONS 398-99 (1931)). Cheng argued that the decision
held that necessity is no longer a right and that its legitimate use is
no longer dependent on the existence of a link with self-preservation.
BIN CHENG,

GENERAL

PRINCIPLES

OF

INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS

et al. eds., 1953).

LAW

AS

APPLIED

BY

71, 74 (George W. Keeton
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pursuing an 'essential interest;' 2) that interest was threatened by a
'grave and imminent peril;' 3) the breach of its international
obligation was the 'only means' of safeguarding that interest; 4) the
breach did not 'seriously impair an essential interest' of the other
state; and 5) it did not 'materially contribute' to the state of necessity
and that no other exception applies. 2'
1. An "Essential Interest"
While an essential interest may be protected only in exceptional
circumstances, 2 the I.L.C. Commentary to the Draft Articles
confirms that this interest extends far beyond threats to the existence
of a state. Indeed the I.L.C. Commentary, in harmony with Ago's
observations,24 further states that "safeguarding the ecological
balance has come to be considered an 'essential interest' of all
States. 21 5 Thus in the Danube Dam Case, Hungary cited the I.L.C.
Commentary,26 along with its endorsement in the Convention on
Biodiversity 27 and the UN Economic Commission for Europe
21. Draft Articles, supra note 16, at 33-52.
22. See, e.g., Ago Report, supra note 6, at 19 (noting that "the
situation in question would have to be extremely serious, and
irrefutably so").
23. Report of the International Law Commission to the General
Assembly on the Work of its Thirty-second Session, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/318/ADD. 49 (1980) [hereinafter I.L.C. Commentary],
reprinted in [1980] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 49, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add. 1.
24. Ago Report, supra note 6, at 14 (stating that an essential
interest includes "the preservation of the environment of its territory
or a part thereof').
25. IL.C. Commentary, supra note 23, at 39.
26. Letter from James Crawford, to the President and Members of
the International Court of Justice, The Suspension and Termination
of Works: The Legal Standards Applied (Mar. 5, 1997), availableat
http://www.mfa.gov.hu/Haga/Day3/10.htm (last visited May 21,
2002).
27. See Letter from Philippe Sands, to the President and Members
of the International Court of Justice, Hungary's Notification of
Termination, Arguments (Mar. 3, 1997) (noting that both Hungary
and Slovakia were both parties to the convention), available at
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Charter on Groundwater Management28 to successfully argue that a
state's ecology constitutes an essential interest.29
2. A "Grave and Imminent Peril"
a. Peril
A peril is a danger that "evokes the idea of risk" rather than
"material damage."3 However, neither the I.L.C., Ago nor the I.C.J.
in the Danube Dam Case identifies any criteria by which to
determine the requisite* gravity. The I.L.C. merely states that the
peril must be "extremely grave,"'" which as Roman Boed notes, is a
vestige of the Grotian requirement that necessity be "nothing
short of
32
extreme exigency" to justify otherwise unlawful conduct.

http://www.mfa.gov.hu/Haga/Day4/17.htm) (last visited May 20,
2002). Article 22 of the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity
provides that the convention "shall not affect the rights and
obligations of any Contracting Party deriving from any existing
international agreement, except where the agreement would cause a
serious damage or threat to biological diversity." Id.
28. See id. "The Charter recognizes the unique importance of
groundwater as a 'natural resource with economic and ecological
value.' It calls for 'special protective measures to aquifers'

. .

. [a]nd

it recommends that where aquifers are 'unique, endangered or
already impaired, groundwater protection strategies should carry
decisive weight'
Id. (quoting UN Economic Commission for
Europe at its Forty-fourth Session Charter on Groundwater
Management, U.N. Doc. E/ECE/1197 (1989), available at http://
www.intemationalwaterlaw.org/RegionalDocs/GroundwaterCharter
.htm) (last visited May 20, 2002).
29. Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung.
v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 35 (Sept. 25).
30. Id.
31. LLC. Commentary, supra note 23, at 49.
32. Boed, supra note 6, at 16 (quoting Grotius).
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b. Imminence

The imminence requirement dictates that there must be "a threat to
the interest at the actual time."33 According to the Danube Dam
Case, imminence is "synonymous with 'immediacy or 'proximity'
and goes far beyond the concept of 'possibility."' 34 The I.L.C. also
accepts that a peril appearing in the long term might be held to be
"imminent" as soon as it is established at the relevant point in time
that the realization of that peril, however far off it might be, is not
thereby any less certain and inevitable.35 According to this
reasoning, it appears that a peril must be unavoidable (100%
probable) for it to satisfy the imminence requirement.36 However,
the I.L.C. failed to address the degree of scientific certainty, if any,
that is permissible.37 At this early stage, it is important to define the
difference between risk and certainty. Risk refers to the probability
that an outcome will occur,38 whereas uncertainty refers to the fact
that the probability of this outcome cannot be predicted with
complete accuracy and indeed, sometimes the range of outcomes is
unknown.39

33. LLC. Commentary, supra note 23, at 19 (describing the
requirement as a "present danger to the threatened interest").
34. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 35.
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. Id. The "not thereby any less" is used to mean that a longterm peril cannot be any different to a short-term peril which must be
"certain and inevitable." Id. See, e.g., Erika L. Preiss, The
International Obligation to Conduct an Environmental Impact
Assessment: The L C.J. Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
Project, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 307, 336 (1999).
37. See discussion infra Part III.A.
38. MICHAEL YOUNG, FOR OUR CHILDREN'S CHILDREN: SOME
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF INTER-GENERATIONAL EQUITY AND
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 13 (1993).

39. Id. Sources of uncertainty include: lack of knowledge about
ecosystem behavior; difficulties in predicting the likely size, needs
and preferences of future but not present human populations;
difficulties in predicting the technical ingenuity of future
generations; and, incorrect assumptions about the functioning of
ecosystems. Id.
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Applying these definitions to the I.L.C.'s reasoning, Figure 1
serves as a useful clarification tool." Since the I.L.C. accepts that a
peril is sufficiently imminent when it is "far beyond the concept of
'possibility,"' 41 and because scientific evidence is never 100%
certain,42 it may be inferred that the I.L.C. will allow for the small
degree of uncertainty over the interval CD. This diagram will be
revisited infra Part III.

In
ftinl

0%Pobability

Will hot occur,

50%ProbAblity

Possibility

?? Probability

der of

100% Probability

Mus: occur
'far beyond the concept of

0'Pssibility" !

(mminence satisfied)
Figure 1

3. "Only Means"
The peril must not have been escapable by any other means, "even
a more costly one, that could be adopted in compliance with
international obligations."43 The I.C.J. confirmed that cost is not a
determinative factor in evaluating whether a state could engage in
unlawful conduct." It may be argued, however, that necessity may

40. This diagram, along with the others infra Part III, do not
imply that the determination of ecological necessity is a
mathematical exercise. Rather, they serve to illustrate the seemingly
abstract ideas discussed.
41. Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung.
v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 35 (Sept. 25).
42. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
43. LLC. Commentary, supra note 23, at 49.
44. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 36.

2002]

THE NECESSITY OF PRECAUTION

still be allowed if the magnitude of the cost to mitigate it would in
itself constitute a threat to an essential interest.45
4. The Balancing Requirement
Although not explicitly mentioned in the I.L.C. Draft Articles, the
balancing requirement has existed since the time of Grotius. 46 It
leaves judicial discretion to ensure that "the interest [arising from the
obligation] sacrificed on the altar of 'necessity' must obviously, be
less important than the [essential] interest it is thereby sought to
save." 47 Prior to the amendment of Article 33 of the I.L.C. Draft
Articles in 1999,48 the test arguably existed in a bilateral paradigm in
that it balanced the essential interest of one state against the interest
arising from the obligation of the other.49 While the 1999
amendment has recognized that the interest arising from the
obligation can include "some common or general interest,"5 this
same recognition'has yet to be afforded to the essential interest of the
state. 1
5. Exceptions to Necessity
According to Article 33, a state cannot invoke necessity where: 1)
other means of safeguarding the interest still exist;52 2) the act
impairs an essential interest of the state towards which the obligation
45. Boed, supra note .6, at 17-18.
46. See id. at 18.
47. IL.C. Commentary, supra note 23, at 50. Disappointingly,
the Danube Dam Case did not address this element.
48. 1999 Report, supra note 16, at pt. 2.5.B.39 n.218. This
amendment clarified that the obligation applied directly to the
"protection of some common or general interest," in contrast to an
indirect interest a state may have. Id.; see also James Crawford,
Revising the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 10 ENVTL. J.
INT'L L. 435, 459 (1999).
49. See Boed, supra note 6, at 19.
50. 1999 Report, supra note 16, at pt. 2.5.B.39 n.218.
51. See discussion infra Part III. It will be argued in Part III that
similar recognition should be afforded to the essential interest.
52. IL.C. Commentary, supra note 23, at 33-52 (citing Article
33).
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existed;1 3 3) the international obligation in question arises from a
peremptory norm of general international law;5 4) the international
obligation in question explicitly or implicitly excludes the possibility
of invoking necessity;5 or 5) the state invoking necessity has
contributed to the situation of necessity occurring. 6 Having outlined
the defense of ecological necessity, its potential application to the
precautionary principle will now be considered.

II. ECOLOGICAL NECESSITY AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

Originating in West German domestic law, the precautionary
principle emerged in international legal instruments in the mid1980s"
While some find it "difficult to speak of a single
precautionary principle at all,"58 labeling it a "variable, vague and

53. Id. at art. 33(l)(b).
54. Id. at art. 33(2)(a).
55. Id. at art. 33(2)(b).
56. Id. at art. 33(2)(c). Note the new provision proposed requires
the state to have "materially" contributed to the state of necessity.
1999 Report, supra note 16, at pt. 2.5.B.39 n.218.
57. See generally Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen, The Precautionary Principle in Germany-Enabling Government, in INTERPRETING
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 31 (Timothy O'Riordan et al. eds,
1994). Vorsorge (German for "precautionary principle") was an
important concept in environmental protection during the drafting of
air pollution legislation in Germany 1970. Id. at 35. Inter alia, it
legitimated action by the state to prevent environmental damage in
advance of proof of damage. Id at 36-37. Some of the instruments
that incorporated the precautionary principle in the 1980s include
principles of the 1982 UN General Assembly Resolution on the
World Charter for Nature, the Convention for the Protection of the
Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic ("OSPAR
Convention"), and Article A7 of the 1984 Bremen Declaration, art
A7; London Declaration of the Second International North Sea
Conference (1987). See infra note 72.
58. Daniel
Bodansky, Scientific Uncertainty and the
PrecautionaryPrinciple,33 ENv'T 4, 5 (1991).
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confusing 'principle,'."59 the essence of the precautionary principle is

aptly reflected in Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development. "Where there are threats of serious
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be
used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation. 60 The question, therefore, is can this
principle be applied to the determination of ecological necessity?
A. The Situation in 1989
In the Danube Dam Case, Hungary argued that a precautionary
approach should be adopted by the I.L.C. in determining whether its
suspension of the treaty in 1989 was due to a grave and imminent
peril.61 Although Hungary put forward six principal ways in which
the construction of the System of Locks would inflict unjustifiable
harm on the ecology of the Danube River and its surrounding
wetlands,62 the I.L.C., without examining the scientific evidence,63
59. James E. Hickey, Jr & Vern R. Walker, Refining the
Precautionary Principle in International Environmental Law, 14
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 423, 431 (1995).
60. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Aug. 12,
1992, 31 I.L.M. 874 [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
61. Memorial of the Republic of Hungary (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1994
I.C.J. Pleadings 198-203 (Case Concerning the GabcikovoNagymaros Project) (CD on file with author).
62. Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung.
v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 30 (Sept. 25). First, the groundwater level
would fall in the Danube river. Id. Second, the residual discharge
would increase the risk of eutrophication of surface water,
particularly in the reservoir of the Danube River. Id. Third, the
decrease in the groundwater level could cause the Danube River to
be "choked with sand," resulting in the network of side-arms to be
"cut off from the principal bed." Id. The side-arms would then dry
up, causing mass extinction of the fluvial flora and fauna therein. Id.
Fourth, the "significant daily variations in the water level" resulting
from the operation of the Gabcikovo power plant would threaten
aquatic habitats. Id. Fifth, the construction of locks at Nagymaros
could silt-up the bed of the Danube River upstream of Nagymaros,
impairing the quality of water in the bank-filtered wells. Id. Sixth,
Hungary feared that construction of the Nagymaros dam would
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held that the environmental risks were both long-term and too
uncertain.' Thus, the imminence requirement was not satisfied.65
Since the I.L.C. came to this conclusion without distinguishing
between the probability of an environmental risk and the uncertainty
of scientific evidence, it is unclear whether, if the precautionary
principle would have applied, if it would have acquired status of a
legal doctrine. 66 Indeed, if there was no scientific uncertainty-that
is, the I.L.C. merely meant that the environmental risks were just
insufficiently probable-there would be no reason to apply the
precautionary principle. Notwithstanding, had the precautionary
principle acquired legal status in 1989, one would expect mention of
it from the I.L.C., especially since Hungary referred to it extensively

erode the riverbed downstream of Nagymaros causing the water
level to fall in that sector, which provides two-thirds of Budapest's
water supply. Id. There was also concern that any water that was
supplied would be diminished in quality as a result of increases in
fine sediments, which would strain the filtration of the water supply.
Id.
63. Id. at 36. For further discussion, see infra Part III.A.
64. Id. at 37. In relation to the potential damage to the
environment of Nagymaros (upstream), "the dangers ascribed to the
upstream reservoir were mostly of a long-term nature and, above all,
that they remained uncertain"; thus they were not imminent in 1989.
Id. at 36. In relation to the downstream part of the project,
the quality of surface water in the Dunakiliti
reservoir, with its effects on the quality of ground
water in the region and . . . to the level, movement
and quality of both the surface water and the
groundwater in the whole of Szigetkoz, with their
effects on the fauna and flora in the alluvial plain, of
the dam to be both long-term and uncertain.
Id. at 36-37. Also, the downstream peril had "already materialized
to a large extent for a number of years [prior to 1989], so that it
could not . . . represent a peril arising entirely out of the project." Id.
at 36. Further, "Hungary had means available to it, other than"
suspension and termination, to ameliorate the situation. Id. at 36.
65. See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
66. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 33-35.
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in its pleadings.67 Yet as Philippe Sands aptly observes, when the
I.L.C. prepared its Draft Articles in 1980, the precautionary principle
"had not yet hit the international stage" and by 1989 it was "only
emerging as an international principle,"68 not nearly a norm of
customary international law. Thus, irrespective of the court's lack of
clarity, given the limited recognition of the precautionary principle
in 1989,69 it was likely absent from ecological necessity at that stage.
B. Can Ecological Necessity Include the PrecautionaryPrinciple
Today?
While there are numerous vexing issues as to whether the
precautionary principle should exist as part of ecological necessity,
Part II.B will determine whether the Danube Dam Case
contemplated that this legal possibility does exist. It will be argued
that the evolutionary character of international environmental law,
combined with the court's emphasis on the importance of
67. Memorial of the Republic of Hungary (Hung. v. Slovk.),
supra note 61, at 198-203.
68. Philippe Sands, Environmental Protection in the Twenty-first
Century: Sustainable Development and International Law, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:
THE ECONOMY AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT 369, 384 (Richard L. Revesz et al. eds., 2000).

69. Early indications of a precautionary approach are evident in
inter alia, the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human and
Environment, available at http://www.unep.org/Documents/?Doc
umentlD=97&ArticlelD=1503 (last visited May 20, 2002). See
generally Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1085; 1982 UN
General Assembly Resolution on the World Charter for Nature,
princ. 11, available at www.un.org/documents/ga/res/37/a37r007.
htm (last visited May 20, 2002); Convention for the Protection of the
Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic (OSPAR
Convention), Sept. 22, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 1076; 1984 Bremen
Declaration, at*art. A7, available at http://odin.dep.no/nsc/ecosyst/
bremen.html (last visited May 20, 2002). However, its first explicit
mention in an international agreement was in the 1987 London
Declaration of the Second International North Sea Conference
(1987), available at http://odin.dep.no/md/nsc/declaration/022001-.
990245/index-dokOOO-b-n-a.html (last visited May 20, 2002).
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environmental concerns, leads to the conclusion that this in fact is a
very real possibility. This possibility may be realized in the present
day based on the endorsement of the precautionary principle in both
numerous international instruments and recent case law.7 °
While the precautionary principle may not have applied to the
enquiry in 1989, we are faced with an entirely different scenario
today. Indeed the I.L.C. recognized that international environmental
law has an evolutionary character by stating that what "might have
been a correct application of the law in 1989 or 1992 could be a
miscarriage of justice if prescribed in 1997. "71 The I.L.C. went on to
emphasize the importance of the environment, that it is "not an
abstraction but represents the living space, the quality of life and the
very health of human beings, ' '72 and that "actual and potential
risks"73 need to be considered but stopped short of mentioning the
precautionary principle as a means of protecting these risks. Most
significantly, the I.L.C. stated that "new norms" have developed,74
and that "in the field of environmental protection, vigilance and
prevention are, required on account of the often irreversible character
of damage to the environment and of the limitations inherent in the
75
very mechanism of reparation of this type of damage.
This discourse arguably constitutes an implicit endorsement of the
precautionary principle 76 and is further supported by Judge77
Weeramantry's endorsement of the "larger principle of caution.
While the judgment may have delivered a disappointing result
according to 1989 facts, it nevertheless provides a promising
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
of the

See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 65.
Id. at 35, 58 (citations omitted).
Id. at 58 (emphasis added).
Id. at 67.
Id. (emphasis added).
See Ellen Hey, The Watercourses Convention in the Context
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case, in REFLECTIONS ON PRINCIPLES
AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 83, 92 (Terry D. Gill et al.
eds., 2000) (noting that the I.L.C.'s language, if it does not endorse
the principle, certainly endorses "the concept of precaution as part of
the discourse of international environmental law").
77. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J.
1, 21 (Sept. 25) (separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry)
[hereinafter Weeramantry Opinion].
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possibility that ecological necessity may today include the
precautionary principle."8
This possibility is bolstered by the infiltration of the precautionary
principle into "virtually every international environmental and
natural resource treaty regime."79
Amongst its dramatically
increased recognition in the 1990s, the precautionary principle has
featured in the Rio Declaration,80 the Helsinki Convention,8' and
numerous others.82 This has led many to argue that the precautionary
78. See generally Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 35, 37, 58, 67 (Sept. 25).
79. David Freestone, International FisheriesLaw Since Rio: The
Continued Rise of the PrecautionaryPrinciple, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT PAST ACHIEVEMENTS AND
FUTURE CHALLENGES 135, 135 (Alan Boyle et al. eds., 1999).

80. Rio Declaration, supra note 60, at princ. 15.
81. Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of
the Baltic Sea Area, 1992 (entered into force Jan. 17, 2000)
[hereinafter Helsinki Convention], available at http://www.helcom.
fi/convention/conven92.html (last visited May 20, 2002). This
incorporation is particularly relevant to transboundary harm. See
U.N. Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary
Watercourses and International Lakes, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1312,
1316 (1992) (stating that "It]he precautionary principle, by virtue of
which action to avoid the potential transboundary impact of the
release of hazardous substances shall not be postponed on the ground
that scientific research has not fully proved a causal link between
those substances, on the one hand, and the potential transboundary
impact on the other hand").
82. See Memorial of the Republic of Hungary, supra note 61, at
202. In its pleadings, Hungary argued. that "[a]lmost no new
international instrument, whether regional or universal, drafted since
1989, ignores the precautionary principle." Id. These instruments
include: Ministerial Declaration of the Third International
Conference on the Protection of the North Sea, The Hague, Mar. 8,
1990, available at http://odin.dep.no/md/nsc/declaration/022001990244/index-dokOOO-b-n-a.html (last visited May 20, 2002); Baltic
Sea Declaration, [1990] 1 Y.B. INT'L. ENVTL L. 424, 427; Second
World Climate Conference (Geneva), [1990] 1 Y.B. INT'L. ENVTL L
473, 475; Bamako Convention 1991, 20 I.L.M. 773, 781 (1991);
London Dumping Convention, Dec. 29, 2972, available at
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3
principle has become a part of customary international law.1
However, this proposition is seriously undermined by the varied
formulations of the principle and its resulting vagueness.84 In the
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 5 the I.L.C. held that before
acquiring the requisite degree of state practice and opinio juris, for a
norm to exist, it must be "of a norm-creating character."86 The I.L.C.
seemed to deny that the equidistance principle was a norm of

http://sedac.ciesin.org/pidb/texts/marine.pollution.dumping.of.wastes
.1972.html (last visited May 20, 2002); U.N. Conference on
Environment and Development: Framework Convention on Climate
Change, 31 I.L.M. 849, 854 (1992) [hereinafter Climate Change
Convention]; Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992,
available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1993/32.
html (last visited May 20, 2002); Maastricht Treaty on European
Union and Final Act, Feb. 3, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247; Convention for
the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Northeast Atlantic,
Sept. 22, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 1069, 1076.
83. See, e.g., Owen McIntyre & Thomas Mosedale, The
PrecautionaryPrincipleas a Norm of Customary InternationalLaw,
9 J. ENVTL. L. 221 (1997).
84. See, e.g., PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 98 (1992).
Despite its attractions, the great variety of
interpretations given to the precautionary principle,
and the novel and far-reaching effects of some
applications suggest that it is not yet a principle of
international law. Difficult questions concerning the
point at which it becomes applicable to any given
activity remain unanswered and seriously undermine
its normative character and practical utility, although
support for it does indicate a policy of greater
prudence on the part of those states willing to accept
it.
Id.
85. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.) (F.R.G. v.
Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4 (Feb. 20).
See generally Vaughan Lowe, Sustainable
86. Id. at 42.
Development and Unsustainable Arguments, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 19 (Alan Boyle et al. eds.,
1999).

2002]

THE NECESSITY OF PRECAUTION

customary international law since, inter alia, there were "very
considerable, still unresolved controversies as to the exact meaning
87
and scope of this notion.
Yet whether the precautionary principle has become a norm of
customary international law is of limited importance. Even if the
precautionary principle exists as a vague principle in soft law, it still
deserves recognition. Indeed the court's distinction in the Danube
Dam Case between "norms" which "have to be taken into
consideration" and "standards" which must be "given proper
weight,
recognizes that standards have been useful in many
contexts, and thus, "for the first time, the I.L.C. accorded some
significance to 'soft,' 'technical' law."89
Opponents of the precautionary principle may argue that its
vagueness precludes its useful operation, as illustrated in the Beef
Hormones case.90 In this case, the United States challenged a ban
imposed by the European Community ("EC") on the importation of
beef produced using artificial hormones, arguing that it failed to
carry out the risk assessment specified in Articles 5.19' and 5.292 of
87. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 42.
88. Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung.
v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 67 (Sept. 25).
89. Paulo Canelas de Castro, The Judgement in the Case
Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project: Positive Signs for
the Evolution of International Water Law, [1997] 8 Y.B. INT'L.
ENVTL. L. 21, 25.
90. EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), Jan. 16, 1998, AB-1997-4WT/DS 26/AB/R [hereinafter
Beef Hormones], available at http://www.sice.oas.org/DISPUTE/
wto/horm-us.asp (last visited, May 20. 2002). This view was echoed
in Australia-MeasuresAffecting Importation of Salmon, report of 20
Oct. 1998, WT/DS18/AB/R, 157, available at http://www.wto.org/
(last visited May 20, 2002), where a "lack of reliable scientific
information" was held to have made an examination "highly
speculative."
91. Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement states: "Members shall
ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures are based on an
assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to
human, animal or plant life or health, taking into account risk
assessment techniques developed by the relevant international
organizations." WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
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the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures ("SPS Agreement").93 Although true that the Appellate
Body of the World Trade Organization rejected that the
precautionary principle might override the explicit language of
Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement,94 few have paid due
credence to dicta.95 Ultimately, such action "does not exclude the
possibility that a risk assessment could be relied upon even if it
indicated a degree of uncertainty."96 Indeed the reason that the EC's
claim failed was not because it was precautionary, but because it was
insufficient for the purposes of Articles 5.1 and 5.2, "at best ...
represent[ing] the beginning of an assessment of such risks."97
The reality is that while it is "in the nature of principles that
uncertainties about their application and even their content
Phytosanitary Measures
(SPS Agreement),
available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/spse/spsagr-e.htm (last visited
May 20, 2002).
92. Article 5.2 of the SPS Agreement states: "[i]n the assessment
of risks, Members shall take into account available scientific
evidence; relevant processes and production methods; relevant
inspection, sampling and testing methods; prevalence of specific
diseases or pests; existence of pest-or disease-free areas; relevant
ecological and environmental conditions; and quarantine or other
treatment." Id.
93. Sands, supra note 68, at 385.
94. Beef Hormones, supra note 90, at para. 125.
95. In interpreting Article 5.1, the WTO Appellant Body found
that the results of risk assessment must merely "sufficiently warrantthat is to say, reasonably support-the SPS measure at stake... [and]
that there be a rational relationship between the measure and the risk
assessment." Beef Hormones, supra note 90, at para. 193 (emphasis
added). Significantly, the risk assessment need not "come to a
monolithic conclusion that coincides with the scientific conclusion."
Id. at para. 194. Indeed, the risk assessment need not "necessarily
embody only the view of a majority of the relevant scientific
community ... [R]esponsible and representative governments may

act in good faith on the basis of what, at a given time, may be a
divergent opinion coming from qualified and respected sources." Id.
at para. 194; see also Sands, supra note 68, at 386.
96. Sands, supra note 68, at 387.
97. Beef Hormones, supra note 90, at para. 207.
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remain,"98 the precautionary principle still has a proven capacity to
be applied as a legal principle.99 This is exemplified in the Southern
Bluefin Tuna case,"° which revolved around the commercial fishing
of southern bluefin tuna, which had reached its historically lowest
levels thus posing serious biological risks.'0 ' The International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea recognized this risk, acknowledged
the scientifically uncertain evidence, and ultimately concluded that
scientific uncertainty should not preclude the parties from "act[ing]
with prudence and caution to ensure that effective conservation
measures are taken."' 02 It was, "[w]ithout a doubt.., a fully fledged
implementation of a precautionary approach in fisheries
management."'0 3 In light of the heightened recognition of the
precautionary principle, the I.L.C. recognized in its 1999 Report that
"Article 33 should not be formulated so stringently that the party
relying on it would have to prove beyond the shadow of a doubt that
Unfortunately the I.L.C.
the apprehended event would occur."'"

98. David Freestone, Caution or Precaution: 'A Rose By Any
Other Name... '?, [1999] 10 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL.L. 25, 27.
99. Freestone aptly notes that
more than thirty years after the UN General Assembly
Resolution 1514 on self determination, international
lawyers, and indeed the members of the International
I.L.C. of Justice (I.C.J.) itself, still debate its exact
content and application ...Despite continued dispute
as to how the principle might be applied, few
international lawyers would today deny that selfdetermination is a principle of international law.
Id.
100. Southern Bluefin Tuna (N.Z. v. Japan) (Austl. v Japan), 381
I.L.M. 1.624 (Provisional Measures Order of Aug. 27, 1999),
available at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (last visited May 20,
2002).
101. Id. at para. 71.
102. Id. at para. 77.
103. Adriana Fabra, The LOSC and the Implementation of the
PrecautionaryPrinciple,[1999] 10 Y.B. INT'L ENvTL. L., 15, 17.
104. 1999 Report, supra note 16, at para. 377.
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"reluctantly decided against including the precautionary principle""°
in the text of Article 33 for reasons discussed infra Part In."6

III. THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF ECOLOGICAL NECESSITY
As argued above, the legal parameters of the precautionary
principle are theoretically compatible with the defense of ecological
necessity.0 7 But before the practical difficulties of this compatibility
are addressed, a far more pressing issue central to ecological
necessity warrants consideration. This concerns the failure of the
I.C.J. to adopt a proper appreciation of environmental risks and to
embrace scientific evidence in its application of ecological
necessity. 08 While there are undoubtedly both institutional and legal
difficulties in confronting scientific evidence, failure to do so
destroys the very foundations upon which ecological necessity rests.
Upon recognizing that scientific evidence is crucial to determining
the imminence requirement, the logical consequence is to apply the
precautionary principle as a tool for evaluating this evidence. The
precautionary principle also has a role as a constituent part of
sustainable development in the balancing requirement. 09 Yet it must
not be forgotten that ecological necessity is an excuse for nonperformance of an existing obligation and consequently, the
precautionary principle must be applied narrowly.
A. The Science of Ecological Necessity
Since ecological necessity exists for the purpose of protecting the
environment, it should be approached not merely from a legal
perspective, but with a proper appreciation of the unique and
105. Id. at para. 378.
106. "[F]irstly because the International I.L.C. of Justice had
endorsed Article 33 and secondly because necessity stood at the
outer edge of the tolerance of international law. for otherwise
wrongful conduct." 1999 Report, supra note 16, at para. 378.
107. See supra Part II.B.
108. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
109. Afshin A-Khavari & Donald R. Rothwell, The ICJ and the
Danube Dam Case: A Missed Opportunity for International
EnvironmentalLaw?, 22 MELB. U. L. REv. 507, 527-29 (1998).
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irreplaceable nature of the environment. Environmental damage
does not merely impede economic development due the massive
costs of remediation,11° but often the damage is irreversible,
detrimentally impacting upon the human environment and,
ultimately, human life."'
In this context, it was most disappointing that although the I.L.C.
in the Danube Dam Case recognized the importance of the
environment,1 2 its denial of the imminence requirement on the basis
of being "long-term and uncertain""' 3 failed to properly appreciate
The very nature of
the true nature of environmental risks.'
ecological damage is that it may take years, even decades, to
manifest at which time the environmental, societal and economic
consequences are both serious and irreversible." 5 While necessity
can only be pleaded in extreme situations, 16 there may be little point
in establishing the defense of ecological necessity if the I.L.C. does
not properly appreciate the ecology of an environment.
The same argument applies equally to the use of scientific
evidence. Before the I.C.J. issued its decision, the outcome of the
case was expected to depend on the court's assessment of the
evidence presented by the parties on environmental degradation.'
110. Gabriel E. Eckstein & Yoram Eckstein, International Water
Law, Groundwater Resources and the Danube Dam Case, in
GAMBLING

WITH

GROUNDWATER-PHYSICAL,

CHEMICAL,

AND

RELATIONS 243 (John
Van Brahana et al. eds., 1998), available at http://www.
internationalwaterlaw.org/Articles/GW-Resources.htm (last visited
May 20, 2002).
111. Id.
112. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 64.
114. Adrianna Koe, Damming the Danube: The International
LL C. of Justice and the Gabcikovo-NagymarosProject (Hungary v
Slovakia), 20 SYDNEY L. REv. 612, 616-17 (1998).
115. Id.
116. See supra, note 22 and accompanying text.
117. "[T]he environmental evidence will play a key role." Paul R.
Williams, International Environmental Dispute Resolution: The
Dispute Between Slovakia and Hungary Concerning Construction of
the Gabcikovo and Nagymaros Dams, 19 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 57
(1994); see also Gaetan Verhoosel, Gabcikovo-Nagymaros: The
BIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF AQUIFER-STREAM
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The I.C.J. even exercised, for the first time in its history, the power
to visit a site pertaining to the case before it.'' 8 Yet when it came to
the examination of scientific evidence in relation to the
determination of the imminence requirement, the I.C.J. merely stated
that it had given it "most careful attention,""' 9 failing to articulate
any substantive findings: "it is not necessary ...

for [the court] to

determine which of those points of view is scientifically better
founded."'." Yet the I.L.C. must have engaged in some analysis of
the scientific evidence to determine that the peril was not
imminent. 2 ' This evincesa disturbing lack of transparency in the
decision-making process, inspiring little confidence in the
accountability of the court.
Although the methodology of the I.C.J. is unacceptable, it is
understandable. From a practical perspective, international
environmental law is an emerging area of law, and thus there was
previously little need to engage with scientific evidence.
Furthermore, research suggests that most I.C.J. judges are unlikely to
have a scientific background sufficient to evaluate the scientific
evidence presented.' 22 Even if the judges could and wished to

Evidentiary Regime on Environmental Degradation and the World
I.L C., 6 EUR. ENVTL. L. REV. 247 (1997).
118. This site visit was undertaken under Article 66 of the Rules of
Court pursuant to the court's function with regard to the obtaining of
evidence. Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project
(Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 9 (Sept. 25).
119. Id. at 36.
120. Id.
121. "[T]he I.L.C. concluded that the threats to ecology had not
been sufficiently established and were merely perceived perils as
opposed to actual and imminent threats." Stephen Stec & Gabriel
Eckstein, Of Solemn Oaths and Obligations: The Environmental
Impact of the I. C.J.'s Decision in the Case Concerning the
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 8 Y.B. OF INT'L. ENVTL. L. 41, 43,
(1997). As Stec and Eckstein note, this "raises a troubling question:
how can a I.L.C. determine the degree or immediacy of a particular
environmental threat without evaluating the very data describing the
peril?" Id. Koe is equally critical. Koe, supra note 114, at 616.
122. Preiss notes that the judges in the Danube Dam Case
"consisted mostly of white male octogenarians, whose legal training
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engage in scientific enquiries, institutional barriers such as lack of
research assistance and insufficient electronic resources, 23 make
such ambitions profoundly difficult.
The failure to examine the scientific evidence produced the I.C.J.'s
highly unsatisfactory test; a test requiring an unreasonably high
degree of both certainty and severity for an environmental risk to
invoke ecological necessity. 24 Had the scientific evidence been
examined, the I.L.C. would have discovered that scientific evidence
is never 100% probable, nor is it ever completely certain. 25 It seems
that the I.C.J. was worried that the mere recognition of scientific
uncertainty would have undermined the sanctity of legal certainty.
The I.L.C. likely feared the undesirable consequences of a slippery
slope; an avalanche of ecological necessity claims using scientific
uncertainty as a cloak for escaping treaty obligations.' 6
If the I.C.J. is to continue to recognize the defense of ecological
necessity, it must accept that scientific evidence is required to
evaluate the imminence and gravity of the peril. 27 Therefore, it must
also accept that scientific evidence will never be completely
conclusive, and that legal certainty will be limited to this extent.
Additionally, given the importance of environmental protection, the
I.C.J. must become more educated about science and using science
and background presumably did not include environmental
concerns." Preiss, supra note 36, at 344 n.205.
123. Chistopher Weeramantry, Some Practical Problems of
InternationalAdjudication, [1996] 17 AUST. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 9-11.
124. Koe, supra note 114, at 616-17.
125. For a framework aimed at assessing the finer detail of
ignorance in necessity. See Stephen R. Dovers & John W. Handmer,
Ignorance, Sustainabilityand the PrecautionaryPrinciple: Towards
an Analytical Framework, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE 167, 178-82 (Ronnie Harding et al. eds., 1999). In
relation to "climate change the uncertainties are enormous." Id. at
168; see also M. Common & T. Norton, Biodiversity: Its
Conservation in Australia 21 (1992); EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE
DIVERSITY OF LIFE (1992).
126. At the same time, "while not sustaining the argument in this
case, the I.L.C. left the door open to the possibility that even a legal
pillar . . . might, in some circumstances, have to yield to
environmental concerns." Stec & Eckstein, supra note 121, at 43.
127. Koe, supra note 114, at 616.
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to help settle legal issues. This may involve developing an
awareness of the technical nature of science and embracing new
discoveries within the decision-making process.128 To the extent that
this causes difficulties for judges, the I.C.J. could consider
appointing impartial experts to evaluate the scientific data and
submit analyses with conclusions.
With this framework in place,'29 the I.C.J. must openly state its
evaluations and even if this does not involve providing technical
benchmarks, it should establish scientific standards and guidelines.
Resulting decisions will thus become more thoughtful, transparent
and factually based. In this context, it will be argued in Part III.B
that the precautionary principle adds certainty to the defense of
ecological necessity. Indeed one reason why the precautionary
principle has been slow to seep into judicial decision-making process
is arguably because scientific evidence has rarely been embraced.
B. "Grave and Imminent Peril" and the PrecautionaryPrinciple
Despite being accused as a "composite of several value-laden
notions and loose, qualitative descriptors,""13 the precautionary
principle can actually add certainty to the decision-making process
by recognizing the "certainty of uncertainty" of scientific
evidence.' 3' This is achieved by recognizing that the graveness of
128. Dovers & Handmer, supra note 125, at 169 "We realize that
quantifying the 'risk' is too often not possible and that we must
make decisions in the face of what is commonly termed
uncertainty." Id.
129. Due to its lack of competence in environmental issues, the
I.L.C. recently created a special Chamber for Environmental
Matters, to which environmental cases would be directed. See
Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Environmental Protection and the
International I.L. C. of Justice, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL I.L.C. OF JUSTICE 293, 295 (Vaughan Lowe et al.
eds., 1996). The Special Chamber has never been used, however,
and the I.L.C. declined to" use it in the Danube Dam Case. Preiss,
supra note 36, at 344 n.204. Serious consideration should be given
to using this Chamber for environmental disputes.
130. Dovers & Handmer, supra note 125 at 173.
131. James Cameron, The PrecautionaryPrinciple: Core Meaning,
Constitutional Framework and Proceduresfor Implementation, in

2002]

THE NECESSITY OF PRECAUTION

399

the peril and the probability of it occurring (its imminence) are
connected;132 and applying a precautionary approach to mediate
between these two considerations. Thus, instead of the I.C.J.
ignoring the graveness of the peril when assessing imminence,133 it
could apply the precautionary principle such that provided the peril
is sufficiently grave,'3 4 scientific uncertainty, as to the probability of
the imminence, does not preclude the imminence requirement being
satisfied. Consequently, since a greater level of certainty is achieved
when the peril is sufficiently grave and there is a chance that the
peril is sufficiently imminent,'35 the I.L.C. can be less concerned
with the varying probabilities of this imminence.' 36
Before applying the precautionary principle, it is useful to define
the scope of its application. Table 1 exhausts the potential scenarios
where the precautionary principle could apply.'3 7 The following
analysis is based on the assumption that the peril is sufficiently

29, 44 (Ronnie
Harding et al. eds., 1999) (citing the Bergen Conference).
132. Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung.
v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 35 (Sept. 25).
133. "However 'grave' [the peril] might have been, it would
accordingly have been difficult ... to see [it] as sufficiently certain
and therefore 'imminent' in 1989." Id. at 37.
134. Note that the precautionary principle may also apply to the
graveness of the harm too: the graver the potential harm, the greater
the level of scientific uncertainty related to this graveness that is
acceptable. However, since a high level of graveness is being used
to justify scientific uncertainty as to the degree of imminence, only a
low level of scientific uncertainty as to the graveness is acceptable.
135. These deductions are conclusions based on incorporating .the
precautionary principle with the basic reasoning used by the I.L.C.
See supra text accompanying note 134.
136. The I.L.C., without the precautionary principle, is restricted to
"certain strictly defined conditions, which must be cumulatively
satisfied," particularly the imminence requirement, in order to
invoke the state of necessity to take action. Case Concerning the
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 34.
137. These diagrams do not suggest a mathematical analysis, but
rather, serve to illustrate the discussion.
PERSPECTIVES ON THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
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grave 38 and serves to assist a court in determining whether
imminence is satisfied.

Mean probability
satisfies the imminence
reciuirement

Mean probability does
not satisfy the
imminence reciuirement

Case (b)

Case (a)

Case (c)

Case (d)

"Scientifically
certain:"
The level of
scientific
uncertainty is not
so high that it
affects whether the
imminence
requirement is
satisfied or not.
Thus the
precautionary
principle does not
aoolv.

'Scientifically

uncertain:"
The level of
scientific

uncertainty means
that there is both a
chance that the
imminence
requirement will
be satisfied and
that it won't be
satisfied.

Note: H corresponds to the range of scientific evidence
(i.e. scientific uncertainty)
138. If the peril is found not to be sufficiently grave, this analysis
does not apply.
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Mean probability

1Case (a)

of risk occurring
0%Probability

50% Probability

IA

IB

Will not occur

Possibility

I

2? Probability

IC

100% Probability

D
Must occur

ifar beyond the conct of

(Imminence satisfied)
Figure 2: Case (a)
Case (a) highlights that recognizing scientific uncertainty does not
mean that a lower probability of imminence is acceptable. As Figure
2 illustrates, the level of scientific uncertainty does not extend so far
as to satisfy the imminence requirement. Thus the precautionary
principle does not apply and the imminence requirement is not
satisfied

2 Case (b)
Mean probability

of risk recurring
0%Probability

50% Probability

t 100% Probability

; C i I ID

IA
Will not occur

? Prob bility

Possibility

Must occur
'far beyond the concept of
'possibility"'

(Imminence satisfied)

Figure 3: Case (b)
The imminence requirement is satisfied but the precautionary
principle is not required since the scientific evidence is sufficiently
certain.
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Mean probability

of risk curring

4Case (d)
1%Probability

50%Probability

IAIS
Will not occur

100% Probability
??Probbility

IC

B

+

Possibility

Must occur

'far beyond the concept
of
"possibility"'

(Imminence satisfied)
Figure 4: Case (c)
This is similar to Case (b) in that the mean probability satisfies the
imminence requirement. However unlike in Case (b), scientific
The
uncertainty extends outside the imminence requirement.
precautionary principle still applies to satisfy the imminence
requirement notwithstanding the existence of scientific uncertainty.

Mean probability
of risk !ccurring

4Case (d)
0%Probability

IA
Will not occur

50% Probability

lB
Possibility

?? Probability

I

100%
Probability

D
Must occur

'for
beyond the concept of

"possibility"'

(Imminence satisfied)

Figure 5: Case (d)
This case may be the most controversial application of the
precautionary principle since the mean probability does not satisfy
the imminence requirement. However in practice, the range of
probabilities is frequently unknown139 and thus the concept of a mean
probability is very artificial. Hence this case is practically very
similar to Case (c); the precautionary principle applies to satisfy the
imminence requirement notwithstanding the existence of scientific

139. YOUNG, supra note 38, at 13.
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uncertainty. 4 ° Rather than the averting scientific uncertainty, this
case provides decision-makers with practical assistance.
Besides adding certainty to the decision-making process, the
application of the precautionary principle shows a proper
appreciation of the significance of the environment and the reality of
uncertainty. 4 However, the principal objection to this analysis is
that it encourages a defendant with a low probability of grave harm
to gather results so that there is enough uncertainty to activate the
precautionary principle. 42 However this can be easily overcome in a
number of ways.
Firstly, the use of a refutable presumption that the defendant's
evidence is acceptable, while highly precautionary, is merely an
extension of the "polluter pays principle" to the "polluter pays for
precaution principle."' 14 3 This could operate such that the defendant's
evidence is presumed to be accurate; 44 however, in the event that it
is found to be unsatisfactory on account of evidence submitted by
the plaintiff, the defendant would have to reimburse the plaintiff for
the scientific studies conducted. This deters a defendant from
conducting studies, which it knows to be incorrect and
simultaneously recognizes that 4the fragility of the environment
deserves the benefit of the doubt. 1
140. Some may argue that since the peril is sufficiently grave, the
mere insufficiency of its imminence should not preclude the
operation of ecological necessity. Ultimately, this hinges on the
tension between intragenerational equity and intergenerational
equity. As later discussed, consideration of the obligation owed
means that the precautionary principle should be applied narrowly
and thus in this respect, intragenerational equity prevails.
141. Dovers & Handmer, supra note 125 at 173-74.
142. See supra Part 11.B discussing Case(d).
143. See Robert Costanza & Laura Cornwell, The 4P Approach to
Dealing with Scientific Uncertainty, 34 ENV'T 12, 18 (1992).
144. See David Farrier, Factoring Biodiversity Conservation Into
the Decision-Making Processes: The Role of the Precautionary
Principle, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 99,
107-10 (Ronnie Harding et al. eds., 1999) (drawing comparison to
burden shifting and reasonable doubt in the criminal process).
145. "Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage,
lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for
postponing such measures, taking into account that policies and
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Yet the latter approach may be faulted in that it imposes too
onerous obligations on a plaintiff since it is required to discharge a
presumption to ecological necessity when in fact ecological
necessity is an excuse to the very obligation that the plaintiff is
owed. Thus a test based on the balance of probabilities may be
preferred. The court may also consider conducting an independent
environmental analysis,146 and thus base its decision on this study,'47
resulting in a transparent and objective decision-making process.'48
Either of these approaches could be further narrowed by restricting
the application of the precautionary principle to a particular and
limited class of activities or substances recognized to possess higher
than usual risks or hazards.'49 Ultimately, the strictness of the test
used will depend on the court's sympathy to the environment. 5

measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as
to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost." Climate
Change Convention, supra note 82, at 854, art.3, princ.3.
146. See Farrier, supra note 144, at 115.
147. Perhaps the fairest cost distribution would be for the
defendant to pay if unsuccessful and for the cost to be shared if the
defendant is successful. Note also that the overall cost of this
alternative would be less since only one rather than two studies are
being conducted.
148. See Farrier, supra note 144, at 110. "The thrust is towards
making decisions more transparent - towards ensuring that they are
not lost within a m6lange resulting from the 'balancing of economic
and environmental factors."' Id.
149. Specifically, this may include applying the principle to
discharges of special chemical, developments of an identified class
such as petrochemical plants, or developments in a designated
environmentally sensitive area.
John Whitehouse, Will the
PrecautionaryPrincipleAffect Environmental Decision-making and
Impact Assessment, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE PRECAUTIONARY

59, 62 (Ronnie Harding et al. eds., 1999); see also Lothar
Gindling, The Status of the Principleof PrecautionaryAction, in 5
INT'L J. ESTUARINE & COASTAL L. 23, 26 (1990).
150. See Farrier, supra note 144, at 109 (purporting that where the
precautionary principle is the test, it "places pressure on decisionmakers to reveal their true values").
PRINCIPLE
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THE NECESSITY OF PRECAUTION
C. Reforming the BalancingRequirement

Assuming ecological necessity is used as an excuse to an economic
treaty obligation, it is contended that the concept of sustainable
development should be used to balance the treaty obligation with the
necessity of environmental protection. 5 ' Sustainable development
reflects "development that meets the needs of the present generation
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs." '52 The precautionary principle plays an important part
of sustainable development in exercising precaution to safeguard the
rights of future generations as embodied in the concept of
intergenerational equity. 53
It is unclear whether sustainable
development is a principle of modem international law,'54 or merely
a concept'55 that lacks normative content.' 56 However, it is widely
accepted that at the very least, sustainable development means that
economic development and environmental protection must be
broadly considered together.5 7
This broad consideration may apply to ecological necessity in the
balancing of the economic obligation owed with the essential
environmental interest to be protected.'58 In mediating between these
considerations, it must be recognized that ecological necessity is not
merely a defense with significance limited to the parties involved in
151. Weeramantry Opinion, supra note 77, at 1.
152. World Commission on Environment and Development, Our
Common Future, GA Res 187, 42 U.N. GAOR, 96th Sess., U.N.
Doc A/42/821Add.5 (1987).
153. The principle of intergenerational rights has been recognized
by Judge Weeramantry, Weeramantry Opinion, supra note 77, at 19,
and by numerous treaties including: 1946 International Convention
for the Regulation of Whaling Convention, Preamble, 161 U.N.T.S.
72, 1849; 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World
Cultural and Natural Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1358; Rio
Declaration, supra note 60, at princs. 3, 4; Climate Change
Convention, supra note 82, at art. pmbl.
154. Weeramantry Opinion, supra note 77, at 19.
155. Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung.
v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 67 (Sept. 25).
156. See Lowe, supra note 86.
157. Id. 32; Weeramantry Opinion, supra note 151, at 1-7.
158. See Lowe, supra note 86, at 36.
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the dispute.'59 Instead, environmental protection transcends the mere
domestic, essential interests of a state to the status of a human
right. 6 Not only did Judge Weeramantry endorse this view, 16' but
also the conception of the test for ecological necessity implicitly
supports a higher end: the defense is activated by the mere
occurrence of an incident in stark contrast to frustration which is
based on the parties' expectations. 6 z Viewed as a human right, the
use of precaution as part of the imminence requirement is more than
justified. 163 It is submitted that since the 1999 amendment to Article
33 recognized that the interest arising from the obligation can
include "some common or general interest,"'" similar recognition
65
should be afforded to the essential interest of a state.1
It must not be forgotten that the party pleading ecological necessity
promised to discharge an economic obligation. Environmental
protection is only one side of the delicate balance of sustainable
development, 66 and it is necessary to consider both'intragenerational
and intergenerational equity.'67 As such, it was recognized above
that the use of the precautionary principle in the imminence
159. See supra Part III.
160. See infra note 162.
161. Judge Weeramantry notes that "[e]nvironmental rights are
human rights." Weeramantry Opinion, supra note 77, at 22.
162. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for
signature May 23, 1969, UN Doc A/CONF.39/27; see Daniel
Reichert-Facilides, Down the Danube: The Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties and the Case Concerning the Gabc'kovoNagymaros Project, 47 INT'L. & COMP. L.Q. 837 (1998).
163. In international human rights complaints procedures, the
precautionary approach tends to be followed. Menno Kamminga,
The PrecautionaryApproach in International Human Rights Law:
How It can Benefit the Environment, in THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CHALLENGE
IMPLEMENTATION 171, 184 (David Freestone et al. eds., 1996).
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164. 1999 Report, supra note 16, at n.218.
165. Weeramantry Opinion, supra note 77, at 1.
166. The delicate balance of sustainable development means that
"efforts to eliminate any given risk will create some new risks."
Frank Cross, ParadoxicalPerils of the PrecautionaryPrinciple, 53
WASH. & LEEL. REv. 851, 882 (1996).
167. Lowe, supra note 86 at 26-30.
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requirement must not lower the probability of imminence that is
acceptable,168 and additionally, an alternative to reversing the burden
of proof was suggested.'69
Although the I.L.C. rejected the inclusion of the precautionary
principle on the basis that necessity stood at the "outer edge of the
tolerance of international law for otherwise wrongful conduct,"' 7 the
narrow acceptance of the precautionary principle as part of
ecological necessity appreciates the importance of environmental
protection while still recognizing the economic obligation owed and
the overriding concept of sustainable development."'
Ultimately the old rights test, despite its abandonment, still haunts
the modem defense-the balancing requirement will continue to
pose the most significant challenges for future judicial decisions in
this context.
CONCLUSION

The inclusion of the precautionary principle in ecological necessity
will serve an important part of environmental protection.
Notwithstanding this importance, perhaps the most insidious element
of ecological necessity is that it fundamentally misconstrues the
nature of environmental protection as an adversarial issue rather than
This is particularly apparent
an obligation owed by each state.'
from the fact that a state cannot invoke necessity if it has contributed
Judge Weeramantry noted that the
the environmental risk.
adversarial procedure followed by the I.C.J. "scarcely does justice to
rights and obligations of an erga omnes character"'73 and that
international law must look beyond the "parochial concerns [of
states] to the greater interests of humanity and planetary welfare."' 74
168. See supra Part II.B discussing Case(d).
169. See supra notes 146-147 and accompanying text.
170. LLC. Commentary, supra note 23, at 378.
171. See Hey, supra note 76, at 92.
172. Hungary argued in its pleadings that "the principle of
prevention, which forms the basis of all environmental law, must be
considered an erga omnes obligation." Memorial of the Republic of
Hungary, supra note 61, at 200.
173. Weeramantry Opinion, supra note 77, at 25.
174. Id.
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The concept of environmental erga omnes obligations has been
mentioned elsewhere'
and indeed the I.L.C. indicated that
environmental protection might potentially have such a character in
stating that it serves the interests of those other than the parties
including the "living space, the quality of life and the very health of
human beings,

including generations unborn."' 7 6

Beyond the

inclusion of the precautionary principle as a key element of
ecological necessity, the future challenge of international
environmental law will be to grapple with the concept of
environmental protection as an erga omnes obligation.

175. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J.
104, 348-350 (July 8) (dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry);
see also MAURIZIO RAGAZZI, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES 154-63 (1997).
176. Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung.
v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 35, 58 (Sept. 25).

